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It is undisputed that the world's financial markets are becoming
increasingly international and increasingly integrated. "How should
regulators respond?" is a hotly contested issue. Academic literature debates
two competing approaches to international securities regulation-
"harmonization" and "regulatory competition." Harmonization is the idea
that rules and regulations should be standardized across countries as much
as possible.' Countries may achieve harmonization by ceding lawmaking
authority to an international body or agency; alternatively, countries may
agree to enact similar rules through their normal, domestic rule-
promulgating procedures. In contrast to the harmonization approach stands
the regulatory competition approach. Under this model, countries do not
coordinate with one another--each country is free to enact whatever rules
and regulations it chooses.2
Each approach has its merits. The main argument for harmonization is
that it reduces transaction costs. Absent harmonization, it can be costly for
multinational corporations to comply with different and perhaps conflicting
regulatory regimes. Harmonization ameliorates this problem, and in
* Tzung-bor Wei, B.A., Harvard University; M.S., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard
Law School, is an associate at Ropes & Gray LLP. The author gratefully acknowledges the
advice and guidance of Professor Hal S. Scott and Professor Howell E. Jackson. The author
also thanks the editors and staff of the Northwestern Journal of International Law and
Business. All errors are the author's own.
1 See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, An Overview of International Finance: Law and Regulation 15
(Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Scott, Overview] (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=800627 (last visited Oct. 21,
2006).
2 See, e.g., Roger Van den Bergh, Regulatory Competition or Harmonization of Laws?
Guidelines for the European Regulator, in THE ECONOMICS OF HARMONIZING EUROPEAN
LAW 27 (Alain Marciano & Jean-Michel Josselin eds., 2002).
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particular, full harmonization eliminates the problem completely, as
companies only need to comply with one set of regulatory requirements.
Harmonization also has other benefits. Proponents argue that it reduces the
cost of information, internalizes externalities across jurisdictions, achieves
economies of scale, enhances the mobility of market participants, and
prevents a regulatory "race to the bottom.
' 3
On the other hand, advocates of regulatory competition assert that
countries should not restrict themselves to a one-size-fits-all approach.4
Different countries should be able to enact different laws to accommodate
different preferences and experiences. The regulatory competition model
allows countries to tailor their laws to country-specific circumstances.
Additionally, regulatory competition fosters innovation because countries
must compete with each other to attract market participants, and they attract
market participants by offering the most efficient regulatory environment.
Companies will choose to issue securities in countries where the regulation
is not so strict that the cost of compliance is prohibitively high and also
where the regulation is not so lax that investors require excessively high
returns to compensate for the additional risks they bear. Over time,
financial activities will concentrate in countries that provide the "best"
regulation. Also, the overall quality of financial markets regulation in the
world will improve, as regulators learn through experimentation and trial-
and-error.'
Amidst the debate between harmonization and regulatory competition,
a third approach to securities regulation has emerged in recent years-the
"equivalence" approach to regulation. Under the equivalence approach, a
host country exempts foreign firms from certain host country rules when the
firms' home country rules are sufficiently similar, or "equivalent., 6 The
equivalence approach represents a compromise between harmonization and
regulatory competition. Like harmonization, equivalence seeks to reduce
the cost of doing business internationally; like regulatory competition,
equivalence allows countries to experiment with slightly different rules and
regulations.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II defines "equivalence" and
discusses three different ways to understand the concept. Part III provides
four examples of equivalence: (1) U.S. and E.U. accounting standards, (2)
3 Id. at 34-35.
4 Id. at 29.
5 For a flavor of the harmonization-versus-regulatory-competition debate, see, e.g. Uri
Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global
Market, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 241 (1997); Van den Bergh, supra note 2; Roberta
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, YALE LAW
SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR STUDIES IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
WORKING PAPER SERIES (2001).
6 Scott, Overview, supra note 1, at 30.
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E.U. regulation of financial conglomerates, (3) U.S. regulation of auditors,
and (4) the U.S.-Canada Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System.
Part IV evaluates the equivalence approach, listing some benefits as
well as some potential pitfalls. This portion of the Article demonstrates that
like harmonization, equivalence lowers transaction costs but has the added
advantage of being more feasible and more sensitive to real differences
between countries. The danger, however, is that equivalence may diminish
investor protection. Additionally, one problem that is sometimes
overlooked is that equivalence does not automatically ensure mutual benefit
or reciprocity. The principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity are often
the basis for international cooperation-a country is unlikely to voluntarily
yield to the demands of another country without some assurance that it will
receive some benefit in return. In the case of equivalence, a country is
unlikely to recognize another country's regulations as equivalent without
some assurance that the latter will reciprocate and recognize the former's
regulations as equivalent. In the past, regulators failed to recognize this
problem and ran into difficulties. More recently, regulators have begun to
address these concerns more explicitly, and equivalence is evolving into
"equivalence-plus-reciprocity," where one country agrees to accept a
second country's regulations as equivalent on the condition that the second
country also accepts the first country's regulations as equivalent.
Equivalence becomes a bilateral, rather than a unilateral, determination.
II. THE CONCEPT OF "EQUIVALENCE"
A. A Working Definition
As we shall see, "equivalence" is difficult to define. The basic idea is
that a host country exempts foreign firms from certain domestic rules when
the home country's rules, to which foreign firms are subject, are sufficiently
similar or "equivalent., 7  This approach presumes that there are some
differences between host country rules and home country rules, but to say
that the rules are "equivalent" is to say that the disparities are not
significant. Hence, equivalence does not mean that two sets of rules are the
same, only that they are close enough or functionally substitutable! In this
sense, equivalence is different from full harmonization, which attempts to
bring two sets of rules into full accordance with one another. Equivalence
demands only partial accordance, such that the policy objectives of the host
country are adequately served by the regulatory scheme of the home
7 id.
8 See Alexander M. Donahue, Equivalence: Not Quite Close Enough for the International
Harmonization of Environmental Standards, 30 ENVTL. L. 363, 370 (2000) (discussing
"harmonization" and "equivalence" in the context of environmental regulations).
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country. 9
B. The Dominant Understanding
Equivalence enjoys increasing prevalence largely due to the efforts of
European regulators. E.U. regulators tout equivalence as a way to
dismantle legal barriers to international financial integration,10 and they
apply equivalence widely, both in the cross-Atlantic context and in the E.U.
internal markets context.
In addition to embracing equivalence themselves, European regulators
have encouraged their American counterparts to do the same. In 2004,
Alexander Schaub, head of the E.U. Internal Market Directorate-General,
testified before the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of
Representatives to advocate equivalence as a basis for E.U. and U.S.
cooperation:
But what all this comes down to in our view is that convergence
alone is not the solution. In many cases convergence of details may
not be practicable, not just between the E.U. and U.S., but even intra-
E.U. and between States of the U.S. If we are to go forward, we will
have to recognize that in some cases what is important is not that we
take identical approaches, but that we agree that we have broadly
equivalent approaches and that we share the same goal.
Before compelling service providers or businesses to comply with
the full set of local rules-including ones which may even contradict
those which they are asked to meet in their home jurisdiction-
regulators and supervisors should follow a "rule of reason" approach.
They should ask themselves whether the ways in which those
companies are regulated in their home jurisdiction meet comparable
or equivalent prudential and investor protection standards to those
achieved by local rules. If there is indeed equivalence, it would not
add to the quality of regulatory protection to insist on compliance
with local rules; it would simply create an unnecessary hurdle to
services being offered to those investors. That cannot be in the
interests of either the E.U. or the U.S.
Working on the basis of equivalence is not an admission of defeat: it
is a healthy recognition by both sides that there can be more than one
way to achieve a common objective.'1
9 Id. at 367-70.
10 See, e.g., E.U.-U.S. Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Schaub Testimony] (statement of
Alexander Schaub, Dir. Gen., Internal Mkt. of the European Comm'n), transcript available
at http://www.iasplus.com/resource/051304as.pdf.
1 Id. (emphasis added).
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In making his case for equivalence, Schaub posits a specific type of
relationship between "equivalence" and "harmonization" (to be precise,
Schaub employs the term "convergence," but this Article treats
"harmonization" and "convergence" as interchangeable).1 2  Here,
harmonization and equivalence are entirely distinct concepts.
Harmonization pushes for rules to become similar. Equivalence allows
differences to persist. Though distinct, harmonization and equivalence can
be complementary. Harmonization is often a starting point. In actuality,
however, full harmonization is rarely possible. Despite the best efforts of
regulators to harmonize, differences between regulatory regimes usually
remain. This may be because there is political opposition to legal reform,
or it may be because the situation is such that it is preferable to converge
only core principles and to allow slight variations in details. In such
instances, the European view is that regulators should shift to the
equivalence regulatory approach as a substitute for the harmonization
approach. As long as there is broad equivalence between two regulatory
systems, the host country regulator should defer to home country
regulation. Forcing foreign companies to comply with local regulation
would be unnecessary-it would be costly and would not add significantly
to investor protection. Under this view, equivalence does not represent
defeat in the reach for harmonization, but rather it is a way to allow
countries to accomplish similar ends, through different means.
C. A Counterpoint Understanding
Despite the efforts of E.U. regulators, some U.S. regulators remain
skeptical about equivalence. For example, following the European Union's
announcement that unless it finds U.S. supervision to be "equivalent" to
E.U. supervision, the European Union will exercise supervisory power over
U.S. financial conglomerates with subsidiaries in Europe, one U.S.
regulator made clear her distrust of the European Union's equivalence
12 Like equivalence, convergence sometimes seems too amorphous an idea to define with
precision. One U.S. regulator quipped, "I am not sure I can define 'convergence,' but I will
know it when I see it. Trust me!" Nevertheless, the regulator ventures the following thought:
"Convergence is the movement of two or more sets of standards toward each other at a
relatively high level, producing identical or nearly identical principles of regulatory
purpose." Roel C. Campos, SEC Commissioner, Convergence and Beyond, Speech at the
U.S.-Europe Symposium: Program on International Financial Systems, Armonk, N.Y. (Nov.
15, 2003), transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchlll503rcc.htm.
Thus described, convergence seems closely related to the notion of harmonization, which
was discussed earlier. One slight difference may be that convergence may be somewhat
broader than harmonization, encompassing situations where there is less than full
harmonization-situations where regulatory systems are harmonized at the level of general
principles, but where they diverge at level of specific rules.
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regime by retorting:
To the extent that 'equivalence' signals an effort to harmonize both
regulatory regimes, we welcome the effort. To the extent
'equivalence' is really a means of having a 'co-ordinator' in the E.U.
evaluate the quality of our regulatory regime, we do not think that
approach will be productive or add to investor protection.
13
And although not all U.S. regulators are "anti-equivalence," sizable
U.S. opposition extends beyond the financial conglomerates context.' 4
Some U.S. regulators even avoid the term "equivalence" whenever possible.
As the foregoing quote illustrates, these regulators prefer instead to talk in
terms of "harmonization" or "convergence."
More fundamentally, these U.S. regulators express a different view
about the relationship between "harmonization" and "equivalence" than the
European view. They insist that harmonization and equivalence are more
alike than distinct-like harmonization, equivalence should focus on
making rules more similar rather than acknowledging persistent differences.
One Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") officer wonders
whether it ever makes sense to think of "equivalence" as distinct from
"harmonization," asking: "[C]an you determine that equivalence has
occurred if there is no harmonization? In that vein, can you reach
'equivalence' if you have only a small amount of 'harmonization?' If so,
how much harmonization produces equivalence? And, finally, what exactly
is 'equivalence' after all?"15 Under this interpretation, equivalence cannot
substitute for harmonization, as Europeans believe, but instead,
harmonization produces equivalence. In other words, two regimes become
"equivalent" after regulators work to make them converge. Conversely, if
two dissimilar regulatory schemes never converge, at least to some degree,
then they can never be equivalent.
So we have two competing understandings of equivalence-the
dominant understanding that equivalence can sometimes be a substitute for
harmonization, and the counterpoint understanding that equivalence cannot
exist without harmonization. What is the significance of this debate? What
is really at stake here? On the U.S. side, one hypothesis is that some U.S.
regulators are worried that the equivalence approach may result in less
13 Annette L. Nazareth, Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation at the SEC, Concerning Certain
Pending Proposals by the European Commission, Testimony before H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., (May 22, 2002), transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
052202tsaln.htm.
14 See, e.g., Nicolaisen, infra note 32 (discussing "convergence" rather than
"equivalence" in the context of accounting standards).
15 Campos, supra note 12.
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rigorous regulations and less protection for U.S. investors. 16  These
regulators are afraid that the United States may be forced to accept E.U.
regulations as equivalent, when in fact, E.U. regulations are too lax. Before
they are willing to defer to E.U. regulation, they want to make sure that that
E.U. regulation is on par with U.S. regulation-hence, they insist on
convergence as a prerequisite for equivalence. Later in this Article, we will
revisit the issue of investor protection.
European regulators, in turn, are wary that when U.S. regulators
advocate "convergence" instead of "equivalence," what U.S. regulators are
really talking about is not bilateral compromise, but for the European Union
to conform to the U.S. regulatory scheme. For this reason, the European
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services responded to a push by the
United States for convergence between U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("U.S. GAAP") and International Accounting
Standards ("IAS") by insisting that "the convergence exercise must be a
two way street and it must not be allowed to destabilise the IFRS platform
in Europe."' 17 To rephrase the Commissioner's concern, if the United States
dominates the convergence project, Europe will view this as an intrusion on
European regulatory prerogatives. This is another issue we will revisit-
whether convergence is sometimes politically infeasible, because it is
perceived as violating national sovereignty, and if so, whether equivalence
can serve as a second-best alternative.
In short, regulators are engaged in a contentious debate over the
definition of "equivalence." Fundamental disagreements over what the
practical effects of "equivalence" and "convergence" will be-e.g. whether
equivalence will result in less investor protection, and whether
"convergence" means conforming to U.S. regulations-complicate this
debate. The remainder of this Article further investigates the concept of
''equivalence" by comparing its advantages and disadvantages to other
regulatory approaches. Part III examines some examples of equivalence,
and Part IV draws from these specific examples to make some general
observations about equivalence. But before turning to these topics, I briefly
address a third way of understanding equivalence, one which has been
articulated by economists and other academics, but has not yet been
expressly endorsed by regulators.
16 See Section IV, infra.
17 See Charlie McCreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Mkt. and Servs., E.C. Strategy
on Financial Reporting: Progress on Convergence and Consistency, Speech at European
Federation of Accountants' (FEE) Seminar on International Financial Reporting Standards
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D. A Market-Based Test for Equivalence
Both the dominant understanding and the counterpoint understanding
of equivalence focus heavily on legal similarities and differences. Both ask
questions such as: What are the substantive laws in different countries? Are
these substantive laws similar or different? If the substantive laws are
similar, is enforcement of laws similar or different? An alternative
approach is to focus on economic effects rather than law per se. Here the
appropriate questions are: How do regulations affect capital markets? Are
these effects similar or different? How do market participants react to the
regulations? Under this view, two regulatory regimes that have different
legal characteristics may nonetheless be "equivalent" if they produce the
same economic effects, i.e. if capital markets treat the regimes as
interchangeable. This can be called the market-based test for equivalence.
One study applies the market-based test to compare U.S. GAAP with
IAS. 18 The precise issue in the study is whether one accounting standard is
better than the other in terms of reducing information asymmetries. 19 This
study examines firms that traded in Germany's "New Market" during 1999
and 2000. One listing requirement was that firms must prepare and publish
annual financial statements in accordance with either IAS or U.S. GAAP.20
In either case, firms faced the same regulatory environment. The study
compares IAS firms and U.S. GAAP firms using various proxies for
information asymmetry-bid-ask spread, share turnover, analysts forecast
dispersion, and IPO underpricing. 1 The study finds that the choice of IAS
or U.S. GAAP did not affect information asymmetry.22 One interpretation
(the study suggests a couple) is that IAS and U.S. GAAP financial
statements are of comparable quality; market participants do not distinguish
between the two standards.23 On this view, one might deem IAS and U.S.
GAAP to be "equivalent."
This market-based understanding of equivalence has yet to be
embraced by regulators. Furthermore, it is not clear that a market-based test
always exists-the above study, for example, draws from a very unique
factual situation and the study warns against generalizing beyond the
German New Market context. 24  Nevertheless, the market-basedunderstanding is important because it supplies one possible answer to a
18 Christian Leuz, JAS versus U.S. GAAP: Information-Asymmetry Based Evidence from
Germany's New Market, 41 J. ACCT. REs. 445 (2003).
19 Id. at 446.
20 Id. at 451.
21 Id. at 446.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 447. A second interpretation is that accounting quality is largely determined by
market forces and institutional factors, rather than accounting standards.
24 Leuz, supra note 18, at 447.
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question that plagues both the dominant understanding and the counterpoint
understanding: "How close is close enough?" The market-based test
response is that two sets of rules are "close enough" when they produce the
same economic effects in capital markets.
III. EXAMPLES OF EQUIVALENCE
Equivalence is not unique to international finance. It has long been
used in other areas of law, such as antitrust, international trade, and
environmental. One example is from the World Trade Organization
Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994. During these talks, participants
discussed how to regulate food safety and animal and plant health. The
resulting Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures recognized
that governments have the right to enact sanitary and phytosanitary
regulations, but only to the extent necessary to protect the lives and health
of humans, animals, and plants.25 Also, regulations should not arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate against WTO member nations where identical or
similar conditions prevail. 2  The Agreement further encouraged countries
to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures by using international
standards where possible. However, where differences persist, "Members
shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as
equivalent.., if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the
importing Member that its measures achieve the importing Member's
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. 2 8 Essentially, the
importing country will defer to the exporting country's regulations if it
deems those regulations to be equivalent to its own. In 1994, the United
States ratified and codified this equivalence approach.29
Securities regulators have borrowed the concept of equivalence and
applied it in a number of instances. The following are some examples.
A. U.S. GAAP and IAS
Currently, U.S. securities law requires companies to state their
financial statements in U.S. GAAP, while E.U. law requires that statements
be prepared in accordance with IAS. The fact that the United States and the
25 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 2, Apr. 15,
1994, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods-Results of the Uruguay Round (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legal-e.htm.
26 id.
27 Id. art. 3.
28 Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
29 19 U.S.C. § 2578a (1994). See Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and
Harmonization, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 692 (1998), for a discussion of equivalence in the
food and drug law and international trade context. See Donahue, supra note 8, for a
discussion of equivalence in the environmental law context.
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European Union employ different, sometimes incompatible, accounting
standards imposes significant costs on companies that issue securities in
both markets, and there have been several attempts to address this problem.
Through the 1990s, the SEC sought to ease the requirement on foreign
issuers to reconcile their foreign financial statements to U.S. GAAP. Then
in 2002, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the
promulgator of U.S. GAAP, and the International Accounting Standards
Board ("IASB"), the standard-setter for IAS, announced the Norwalk
Agreement, which aimed at reducing differences between IAS and U.S.
GAAP.3 ° More recently, the European Commission declared that it will
allow U.S. companies to use U.S. GAAP in the European Union if it
determines that U.S. GAAP is equivalent to IAS. 3' The SEC also
announced a "roadmap," which may lead to the use of IAS in the United
States. 32 This section discusses these developments in more detail.
33
1. U.S. GAAP in the United States
In the United States, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,34 the
SEC has authority to establish accounting principles for businesses under its
jurisdiction. Generally, the SEC permits the accounting profession and the
private sector to self-regulate the accounting practice. Since 1973, the SEC
has designated FASB, a private organization, as the standard-setter of
accounting principles. FASB establishes U.S. accounting standards by
publishing several types of documents. The most important publication is
the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard. The Statement of
Financial Accounting Standard sets forth new accounting standards, the
effective date and method of transition, background information, a brief
summary of research done on the project, and the basis for the Board's
conclusions.36 To further clarify the application of its Statements, FASB
30 Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), Memorandum of Understanding:
The Norwalk Agreement (Sept. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Norwalk Agreement], available at
http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf.
31 See Council Directive 03/7 1, art. 20, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (E.C.); see also Council
Directive 04/109, art. 23, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (E.C.).
32 Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 661, 673 (2005).
33 This section draws from Stavros Gkantinis, IFRS and U.S. GAAP: Convergence and
Equivalence (2005) (paper on file with author).
34 Securities Exchange Act § 13(b), codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2002); 15 U.S.C. §
77s (2006).
35 See Financial Accounting Standards Board, http://www.fasb.org (last visited Dec. 21,
2006); DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATrHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 132-44 (3rd
ed. 2001).
36 See FASB: Facts about FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml#decision-making
(last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
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issues Interpretations. Interpretations modify or extend existing standards.37
Additionally, when businesses apply FASB Standards and Interpretations,
they sometimes encounter difficulties or uncertainties, and they may ask
FASB staff to provide further clarification. When fielding these questions,
FASB staff may decide that some have widespread relevance and may wish
to disseminate guidance more broadly. In this case, the staff may issue a
Staff Position. Staff Positions are also used to make narrow and limited
revisions to Statements or Interpretations.38 Finally, FASB publishes
Statements of Concepts. Statements of Concepts do not announce new
accounting standards; instead, they provide a general framework and
agenda that FASB will follow to formulate new standards in the future.
39
Together, these various FASB pronouncements, along with non-superseded
statements by FASB's predecessors and certain SEC's accounting rules,
form U.S. GAAP.
Until 2002, Congress placed few restrictions on the SEC's authority to
delegate the power to establish accounting rules to a private entity. Then in
2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires that before
the SEC may recognize a private entity as the standard setter of accounting
principles, it must verify that the private entity meets several
requirements. 40 The entity must (1) have a board of trustees, the majority of
whom are not associated with any public accounting firm, (2) be funded as
provided in section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (3) have
procedures to ensure prompt consideration of changes to accounting
principles necessary to reflect emerging accounting issues and changing
business practices, and (4) consider the extent to which international
convergence on high quality accounting standards is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest.
4
'
2. IAS in the European Union
Until recently, Europe lacked a set of continent-wide accounting rules;
instead, accounting was the domain of national governments. In 2002, the
European Council and Parliament adopted IASB as the E.U. counterpart to
FASB by passing the IAS Regulation, which required E.U. companies listed
in the European Union to use IAS starting in January 1, 2005. 4P IASB, like
FASB, is a private organization, but one difference is that IASB purports to




40 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108(a), 116 Stat. 745, 768 (2002).
41 Id. For additional discussion, see also Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB:
Organization and Influence 15 (2005) (on file with author).
42 Regulation 02/1606, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1-4 (E.C.).
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the world's capital markets.43
While the European Union recognizes IASB as the standard-setter, the
European Union does not automatically defer to the IASB on accounting
issues. When the IASB promulgates a new accounting standard, this
standard undergoes an endorsement process in which the European
Commission reviews whether the standard meets several requirements.44
The proposed standard must (1) not be inconsistent with the requirement
that annual accounts shall give a true and fair view of the company's assets,
liabilities, financial position and profit or loss, (2) be conducive to the
European public good, and (3) meet the criteria of understandability,
relevance, reliability and comparability required of the financial
information needed for making economic decisions and assessing the
stewardship of management.45 Only when the Commission is satisfied that
an IASB standard meets these requirements may it adopt the standard by
passing a new regulation.
This endorsement process is not mere formality. One particularly
controversial IASB accounting standard was IAS 39, which dealt with the
accounting of derivatives.46 In its initial proposal, IASB permitted entities
to record derivatives at fair market value, as opposed to historical cost.
4 7
The European Commission disagreed, arguing first that fair market value is
not always easily verifiable, and second that the proposed standard would
lead to increased earnings volatility. 48 After extended discussions with
European regulators, IASB made some concessions, and the final IASB
version of the standard imposed various limits on the use of the fair value
option.49 Nevertheless, the Commission remained less than fully satisfied
and carved out portions of the IASB standard before adopting an
incomplete version of IAS 39 in 2004.50 In 2005, IASB continued to work
with the Commission, and the two parties were able to resolve some
disagreements. This led the Commission to amend its IAS 39 regulation in
November 2005; nevertheless, differences remain between the European
Union and the IASB versions of lAS 39.
51
In summary, the United States and the European Union are separated
43 See International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation Constitution, pt. A, §
2(a), July 1, 2005; see also Fleckner, supra note 41, at 6.
44 See Regulation 02/1606, art. 3(2), 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1-4 (E.C.).
45 Id.
46 For a more detailed discussion, see HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 69-70 (13th ed. 2006) [hereinafter SCOTT,








not only by the Atlantic, but also by differences in accounting. Many are
working to bridge these differences. In 2002, FASB and IASB announced
the Norwalk Agreement, which aimed to converge IAS and U.S. GAAP.
52
The Norwalk Agreement was not an official agreement between the U.S.
government and the E.U. government, but a private agreement between two
nongovernmental entities. Nevertheless, it was an important development
and was praised by U.S. and E.U. regulators.53  Currently, while the
Norwalk project remains ongoing, significant differences remain between
the two accounting systems, and there is no indication that the Norwalk
Agreement will yield full convergence, at least not within the short-term.
Meanwhile, the SEC and the European Commission have undertaken their
own efforts at addressing the trans-Atlantic accounting problem. We now
address these efforts.
3. U.S. GAAP in the European Union
Previously, accounting in Europe was only regulated at the nation-state
level. Generally, member states permitted U.S. companies listed in Europe
to publish their accounts in U.S. GAAP. Recently, however, the European
Union passed two Directives-the Prospectus Directive and the
Transparency Directive-that requires foreign companies listed in Europe
to state their financial statements in IAS as of January 1, 2007. Under the
Prospectus Directive, non-E.U. issuers conducting a public offering within
the European Union will need to publish a prospectus, which must include
financial statements prepared in accordance with IAS. 4  Under the
Transparency Directive, non-E.U. issuers whose securities are traded on an
E.U. market will have to provide annual and half-yearly financial
statements prepared in accordance with IAS. 5
However, there is an important exception. Recognizing that the IAS
requirement imposes a significant obstacle for companies, the European
Union has indicated that it may accommodate certain foreign companies
using the equivalence approach. Specifically, non-E.U. companies will be
able to use non-IAS accounting standards if the European Commission
determines that such standards are equivalent to IAS.
56
52 Norwalk Agreement, supra note 30.
53 Press Release, SEC, Actions by IASB, FASB praised (Oct. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-154.htm; Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Financial
Reporting: European Commission Welcomes IASB/FASB Convergence Agreement (Oct.
29, 2002), available at http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Accounting/Oct2902-
Accounting-Convergence.asp.
54 Council Directive 03/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (E.C.).
55 Council Directive 04/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (E.C.).
56 See Council Directive 03/71, art. 20, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (E.C.); see also Council
Directive 04/109, art. 23, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (E.C.).
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For assistance in making the equivalence determination, the
Commission turned to the Committee of the European Securities Regulators
("CESR"), an advisory committee of European regulators, and asked the
committee for an assessment of whether certain non-lAS accounting
standards, including U.S. GAAP, are equivalent to IAS.57 CESR responded
by publishing a Concept Paper discussing what "equivalence" means in the
accounting context and the methods and criteria CESR will use for making
58its equivalence determinations. CESR explained that "equivalent" should
not mean "identical"; instead, CESR will focus on whether non-lAS
standards provide sufficient information to enable investors to make similar
decisions in terms of whether to invest or divest, as if they were provided
with IAS financial statements. 59 CESR also explained that for each non-
IAS accounting standard, it will make three assessments.60 First, CESR will
evaluate the non-lAS standard against four characteristics-relevance,
understandability, reliability, and comparability.61 CESR believes that
investors should be able to make economic decisions on the basis of
understandable, relevant, reliable, and comparable information about the
issuer's assets and liabilities, financial position, and profit or loss. 62
Second, CESR will conduct a technical assessment, meaning that it will
examine the accounting principles, concepts, and rules of the non-lAS
accounting standard to determine whether any differences with IAS are
significant. 63 Third, if CESR finds that there is non-equivalence due to
significant differences between the two accounting standards, it will
consider what remedy would be appropriate, and whether issuers should be
required to restate their financial statements, or whether there may be more
limited remedies.64
Applying this methodology, CESR studied the accounting standards
used in three countries: the United States, Canada, and Japan. The group
published its findings in June 2005.65 CESR concluded that these three
GAAPs, each taken as a whole, are equivalent to IAS, subject to some
57 CESR, Concept Paper on Equivalence of Certain Third Country GAAP and on
Description of Certain Third Countries Mechanisms of Enforcement of Financial
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conditions. 66 With respect to U.S. GAAP, the conditions were that (1)
certain companies that have subsidiaries which are not consolidated for
U.S. GAAP purposes, but are required to be consolidated under IAS, must
include unconsolidated entities on their U.S. GAAP pro forma balance
sheets and income statements, (2) the United States adopt accounting
policies for the expensing of stock options on a basis equivalent to IAS, and
(3) with respect to certain IAS standards that are significantly different from
U.S. GAAP, U.S. companies make additional disclosures.67 The option
expensing condition has since been satisfied,68 and with regard to the other
two conditions, responsibility to comply rests with individual issuers.
The European Commission is currently considering CESR's
recommendations and must soon make a decision about U.S. GAAP (as
well as Canadian GAAP and Japanese GAAP). There are several possible
outcomes. The Commission may agree with CESR that U.S. GAAP is
equivalent. Alternatively, the Commission may reject CESR's findings and
require U.S. companies to prepare IAS statements beginning January
2007.69 A third possibility is to postpone the equivalence decision for two
years, and in the meantime, allow U.S. companies to continue to use U.S.
GAAP. This last proposal was suggested by Charlie McCreevy, European
Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services. 0 I will later examine
why Commissioner McCreevy favors this option.
4. IAS in the United States
Currently, the United States does not recognize the IAS, or any other
accounting standard, as an acceptable alternative to U.S. GAAP. The SEC
requires that foreign issuers in the United States either prepare a set of
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP, or reconcile foreign
statements such as IAS statements, to U.S. GAAP. 71 Reconciliation is a
difficult and costly process in which the foreign issuer must explain
material variations between the foreign accounting method and U.S.
GAAP.72 The requirement is a significant obstacle for foreign companies
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 The U.S. adopted option expensing under FASB Accounting Standard No. 123, Share-
Based Payment, which in most cases became applicable in 2006.
69 For a summary of the adoption of IAS in Europe, see Alexander Schaub, The Use of
International Accounting Standards in the European Union, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 609
(2005).
70 See McCreevy, Convergence Speech, supra note 17.
71 See SEC Form 20-F, Items 17(c) and 18(c) (2005); see also Reg. S-X, 17 CFR § 210.4-
01 (a)(2) (2006).
72 See, e.g., Rachel Camachan, A Third Way: The Case for Competition Between U.S.
GAAP and IFRS in U.S. Capital Markets 9 (2003) (paper on file with author); Franklin R.
Edwards, Listing of Foreign Securities on U.S. Exchanges, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Winter
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seeking to be listed on a U.S. exchange. 3
Since the 1990s, the SEC has permitted some exceptions to this
reconciliation requirement. Foreign issuers are allowed to use certain IAS
standards without reconciling to U.S. GAAP, including use of IAS 7 to
prepare a statement of cash flows, use of IAS 21 governing the effects of
hyperinflation, and the use of certain portions of IAS 22 regarding the
method of accounting for a business combination. 74 "[T]he objective of this
approach," the SEC explains, "is to protect the interests of U.S. investors by
requiring that all companies accessing U.S. public markets provide high
quality financial reporting that satisfies the informational needs of
investors, without requiring use of U.S. standards in the presentation of that
information. 75 Essentially, the SEC has decided that IAS 7, IAS 21, and
IAS 22 provide the same information as their U.S. counterparts.
More recently, the SEC signaled that it may be willing to consider
wider acceptance of IAS. In a Concept Release issued in February 2000,
the SEC invited comments on whether it should accept financial statements
of foreign issuers prepared using IAS. 76 The Commission explained that it
was considering several alternatives: (1) maintaining the current
reconciliation requirements in all respects; (2) removing some of the current
reconciliation requirements for selected IAS standards and extending that
recognition to additional IAS standards as warranted based on future
review; (3) relying on IAS standards for recognition and measurement
principles, but requiring U.S. GAAP and SEC supplemental disclosure
requirements for footnote disclosures and the level of detail for line items in
financial statements; (4) accepting financial statements prepared in
accordance with the IASC standards without any requirement to reconcile
to U.S. GAAP.77
Further progress was made in April 2005, when the SEC announced a
"roadmap" for moving toward the fourth alternative-accepting IAS
statements without the reconciliation requirement. 8 In this roadmap, SEC
Chief Accountant Donald T. Nicolaisen acknowledged that the world needs
a high quality accounting standard that can be applied in a consistent
manner, and he hoped that IAS will gain global acceptance. 79 Nicolaisen
also expressed that he would like to see further convergence between U.S.
1993, at 28-36.
73 See, e.g., Carnachan, supra note 72.
74 See SEC Form 20-F, Items 17(c) and 18(c) (2005); see also 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f
(2006).
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GAAP and IAS, such that the standards be reasonably comparable to each
other, and such that investors are capable of and comfortable in
understanding the nature of differences between the two sets of standards.8°
Nicolaisen envisioned a future in which U.S. GAAP and IAS coexist and
enjoy widespread acceptance. 8' The roadmap also indicated that over the
next few years, the SEC intended to (1) identify any changes to SEC rules
that will be necessary upon elimination of the reconciliation requirement,
(2) review the faithfulness and consistency of IAS statements filed by
foreign private issuers, and (3) review the status of IAS-U.S. GAAP
82convergence. Around 2009, the SEC will decide whether to eliminate the
reconciliation requirement.
When the SEC eventually confronts the issue of whether to eliminate
the reconciliation requirement, it will essentially be making an equivalence
determination, even though it refrains from using the term "equivalence."
The SEC's decision to accept IAS statements without reconciliation means
that the SEC believes that IAS serves an adequate substitute for U.S.
GAAP. The 2005 roadmap seems to indicate, however, that there must be
substantial convergence between IAS and U.S. GAAP accounting standards
before the SEC is willing to accept them as equivalents. As to how much
convergence is necessary, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox recently
indicated in a February 2006 press release that "while he would not insist
on a particular degree of convergence as a prerequisite for elimination of
the reconciliation, he would expect to see an effective process for
converging IFRS and U.S. GAAP, demonstrated by measurable progress in
addressing priority issues."
83
B. The E.U. Financial Conglomerates Directive
Another use of "equivalence" occurs in the E.U. Financial
Conglomerates Directive. The Financial Conglomerates Directive was
adopted in December 2002 and went into effect in January 2005.84 Prior to
the Directive, the European Union regulated financial institutions on a
stand-alone basis. This meant that different types of financial institutions-
banks, insurance companies, investment companies, and securities firms-
were supervised separately by different government regulators, such as
central banks, securities commissions, and ministries of finance.85
'
0 Id. at 671.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Press Release, SEC, Accounting Standards: SEC Chairman Cox and E.U.
Commissioner McCreevy Affirm Commitment to Elimination of the Need for Reconciliation
Requirements (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-17.htm.
84 Council Directive 02/87, 2003 O.J. (L 35) 1 (E.C.).
85 Id. Recital 1.
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However, with the emergence of financial conglomerates-financial groups
that provide services and products in different sectors of the financial
markets-the European Union came to realize that stand-alone supervision
was inadequate. For example, one concern was that stand-alone
supervision permitted conglomerates to cheat capital adequacy
requirements. 8  In general, regulators require that financial institutions
maintain at least some threshold level of capital to ensure their continued
viability; in the case of conglomerates, regulators were worried that
conglomerates could move capital between their subsidiaries, using the
same capital as a buffer against risks in two or more subsidiary entities, a
practice know as "double gearing. ''87 In response to such concerns, the
Financial Conglomerates Directive provides prudential supervision on a
group-wide basis, also known as supplementary supervision. In particular,
the Directive instructs European regulators to regulate financial institutions
at the conglomerate level, by monitoring their solvency position and risk
concentration, their intra-group transactions, their internal risk management
processes, and the fit and proper character of the management. 88 As of
November 2005, European regulators had identified sixty-three groups in
Europe as financial conglomerates subject to supplementary supervision
pursuant to the Directive.
To achieve group-wide supervision, the Directive appoints for each
conglomerate a regulator who serves as the coordinator. 9° This regulator
coordinates the supervisory efforts of all the other government regulators,
each of whom oversees individual entities within the conglomerate. Prior
to the Directive, the patchwork system of stand-alone supervision resulted
in undesirable "underlaps"-important conglomerate-level issues were
unregulated.92 The stand-alone system also resulted in certain "overlaps"-
some financial entities were covered by different sets of regulations.93
After the Directive, the hope was that the conglomerate coordinators would
close loopholes in the regulatory scheme, reduce duplicate supervision,
86 European Commission, Internal Mkt. Directorate Gen., Towards an E. U. Directive on
the Prudential Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, Consultation Document,





89 Clive Briault, Managing Director, Retail Markets, Speech at FSA Joint Level 3
Committees Conference, Brussels (Nov. 24, 2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2005/ 1124_cb.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
90 Council Directive 02/87, art. 10(1), 2002 O.J. (L 25) 1 (E.C.).
91 Id.




which were burdensome and costly for supervisors and the supervised
entities, and simplify procedures and supervisory efforts.94  The
coordinators' specific responsibilities include gathering and disseminating
information about the conglomerate, supervising and assessing the financial
situation of the conglomerate, assessing whether the conglomerate is
complying with rules on capital adequacy, risk concentration, and intra-
group transactions, and planning supervisory activities.95
Article 10 of the Directive governs the appointment of coordinators.
Where a regulated entity heads a financial conglomerate, Article 10
appoints as the coordinator the government regulator that oversees the
parent entity. Where a non-regulated entity heads a conglomerate, Article
10 selects from among the regulators of subsidiary entities by considering
factors such as the locations of the head offices and the relative importance
and size of the various entities within the conglomerate.96
The impact of the Directive is not restricted to European companies.
Pursuant to the Directive, a non-European parent company that does not
itself do business in the European Union may nonetheless be subject to
European regulation if it owns a subsidiary financial institution that
operates in Europe.97 Whether or not European supervision is warranted
turns on an equivalence determination, a determination that is made by the
coordinator of the conglomerate. 98 If the coordinator determines that the
parent is subject to third-country supervision that is equivalent to European
supervision, then the coordinator does not have to exercise supplementary
supervision.99 If the coordinator determines that third-country supervision
is not equivalent, it may exercise supplementary supervision over the
parent. Alternatively, the coordinator may require that the conglomerate
establish a European holding company, which would be the parent company
for the European subsidiaries of the conglomerate.100  This holding
company would be subject to supplementary supervision. The Directive
also permits coordinators to consider other solutions as they see proper.' °
As of November 2005, there were fifteen non-European conglomerates with
a European presence (importantly, in this context Switzerland counts as a
non-European country because it lies outside the European Economic
94 Id.
95 Council Directive 02/87, art. 11, 2002 O.J. (L 25) 1 (E.C.).
96 Id. at art. 10, 2002 O.J. (L 25) 1 (E.C.).
97 Council Directive 02/87, art. 5(3), 2002 O.J. (L 25) 1 (E.C.).
98 Implementation and Interpretation of Directive 2002/87/EC - the Financial
Conglomerates Directive, Item 46 (Nov. 14, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal
market/financial-conglomerates/docs/20051114_issuesen.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
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Area). 102
To decide whether third-country supervision is equivalent, E.U.
regulators must consider two issues. The first is whether the third-country's
substantive rules, as enforced, are consistent with the Directive. Recital 13
of the Directive requires that European entities with foreign parents should
be "subject to equivalent and appropriate supplementary supervisory
arrangements which achieve objectives and results similar to those pursued
by the provisions of this Directive. "10 3  However, having comparable
substantive regulations is not enough. Recital 14 additionally requires the
full participation and assistance of the third-country regulator-"equivalent
and appropriate supplementary supervisory arrangements can only be
assumed to exist if the third-country supervisory authorities have agreed to
cooperate with the competent authorities concerned on the means and
objectives of exercising supplementary supervision of the regulated entities
of a financial conglomerate."
' 0 4
In the United States, the Directive had very little impact in the banking
industry but had significant impact on the securities industry. 5 With
respect to U.S. banks, the Federal Reserve had long been supervising
banking institutions at the holding company level. The Federal Reserve
believed that its practices were fully consistent with the requirements of the
Financial Conglomerates Directive, and it was confident that its regulatory
scheme would be found to be equivalent to the European framework.'
0 6
In the securities industry, at the time, the SEC only regulated
companies at the broker-dealer level and not at the holding company level.
Consequently, U.S. securities firms expressed concern that E.U. regulators
would find U.S. securities regulation non-equivalent to European
regulation, and that as a result, they would be adversely impacted by the
Directive.10 7 In particular, U.S. companies worried that they would face
increased costs of doing business in Europe, that they could be subject to
102 Briault, supra note 89.
103 Council Directive 02/87, 2002 O.J. (L 25) 1 (E.C.).
104 Id. See also General guidance from the European Financial Conglomerates Committee
to E.U. supervisors: the extent to which the supervisory regime in the United States of
America is likely to meet the objectives of supplementary supervision in Directive
2002/87/EC, (July 6, 2004), [hereinafter Guidance to E.U. supervisors re: U.S.] available at
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/financial-conglomerates/docs/guidance-usa-final-060704
_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
105 Ivo Keltner, Financial Conglomerates Directive and Its Impact on U.S. Firms 23
(2003) (unpublished LLM thesis, Harvard Law School).
106 European Union's Financial Services Action Plan, Testimony before H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. (May 22, 2002) (statement of Mark W. Olson), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2002/20020522/default.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2007).
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higher capital and risk control requirements than an E.U.-based firm and
thus be placed at a competitive disadvantage, and that they might be
required to create a holding company in the European Union.
0 8
Congress and the SEC responded to these concerns. In 1999, Congress
passed legislation authorizing the SEC to supervise the holding company of
a SEC-registered broker-dealer,'0 9 and in 2004, the SEC promulgated rules
permitting holding companies to voluntarily apply for SEC supervision on a
group-wide basis.) Such a holding company would become a "supervised
investment bank holding company" ("SIBHC")."1 In its release, the SEC
expressed that it expected its new rules would meet the equivalence
standard of the E.U. Directive."2 The release also contemplated significant
cost savings for U.S. companies. The SEC calculated that in the absence of
an equivalence determination, if an E.U. regulator were to require a U.S.
company to create a European holding company, it would cost the U.S.
company approximately $8 million plus additional potential costs. 113 These
expenditures would not be necessary if E.U. regulators recognized the SEC
as an equivalent supervisor.
The new SEC rules impose similar obligations on holding companies
as the European Financial Conglomerates Directive. To qualify for SIBHC
status, a U.S. holding company must have a subsidiary broker-dealer with a
substantial presence in the securities markets, which may be demonstrated
by a showing that the broker-dealer maintains tentative net capital of $100
million or more.' 14 Upon becoming a SIBHC, the holding company must
meet certain requirements regarding its group-wide internal risk
management control system, recordkeeping, and periodic reporting.'
5
Additionally, a SIBHC must calculate net capital on a consolidated basis
according to rules designed to be consistent with Basel standards. 16 The
SEC believed that three U.S. companies would seek SIBHC status pursuant
to the new rules." 17
Presently, European coordinators must determine whether U.S.
supervision is equivalent to E.U. supervision. In June 2004, the European
Financial Conglomerates Committee and the European Banking Advisory
108 Id.
109 Pub. L. No. 106-102, Title II, § 231(a), 113 Stat. 1402 (1999).
110 Final Rule: Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, SEC Release No. 34-
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Committee 1ointly published a report issuing general guidance to E.U.
supervisors. 18 After reviewing the U.S. regulatory system, the report found
that there was broad equivalence across the various financial industries-
banking, securities, and insurance markets.11 9  However, the report
contained certain caveats. The report noted that some U.S. regulators,
including the SEC, were undertaking consolidated supervision for the first
time (the report conceded that this was also true for European regulators). 2 0
It also advised that although on paper U.S. regulations should be capable of
achieving the objectives of the Directive, final judgment should depend on
how well the regulations work in practice.12  In particular, the report
cautioned E.U. regulators that the new SEC rules were peculiar in that they
created a voluntary regime, as groups can opt into and withdraw from the
regime. 122 Nevertheless, the report also expressed the opinion that this
alone should not prevent the regimes from being effective. Finally, the
report warned that the SEC rules were more lenient than European rules in
one respect-that SEC rules permit holding companies to include
unsubordinated long-term debt in capital for a transitional period. 24 E.U.
supervisors should consider whether this poses a problem.
Notwithstanding the June 2004 general guidance report, E.U.
coordinators must ultimately decide for themselves whether U.S.
supplementary supervision is adequate. For most U.S. companies operating
in Europe, the Financial Services Authority ("FSA") in the United Kingdom
is the E.U. coordinator. The FSA has indicated that in the case of non-
equivalence, it is likely to require the non-European conglomerate to
establish a European holding company. The FSA would monitor and
restrict activities between the European sub-grou12 and the worldwide
group, a regulatory practice known as "ring-fencing.
Curiously, the FSA decides whether foreign financial conglomerates
are subject to equivalent home supervision on a firm-by-firm basis rather
than a country-by-country basis. Moreover, these decisions are not publicly
available-they are communicated directly to firms through private letters.
The only publicly available information about the status of U.S.
conglomerates comes from an October 2005 speech by a SEC regulator. 26
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The regulator revealed that, as of the date of the speech, the FSA had
accepted the SEC's oversight of U.S. investment bank Merrill Lynch as
equivalent to the supervision described in the Directive. 27  Also, the
regulator expected the FSA to make equivalence findings with regard to
other U.S. broker-dealer groups within the following month.'28
Presumably, this is done, but the FSA has not made any public
announcements. Later, this Article will discuss the non-transparent manner
in which the FSA makes its equivalence determinations.
C. U.S. Regulation of Auditors
A series of corporate scandals, beginning with the collapse of Enron in
late 2001, prompted many to question the integrity of the accounting
profession. To address these concerns, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002. Among the changes it brought, Sarbanes-Oxley created
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), a private-
sector, nonprofit organization charged by federal law to oversee the
accounting profession. Such a regulatory body had never existed before.
The PCAOB's statutory responsibilities include:
(1) registration of accounting firms that audit public companies
trading in U.S. securities markets, (2) inspection of registered
accounting firms, (3) establishment of standards for auditing, quality
control, ethics, and independence, as well as attestation, for
registered accounting firms, and (4) investigation and discipline of
registered accounting firms and associated persons for violations of
law or professional standards. 1
29
The PCAOB is supervised by the SEC, which must approve the PCAOB's
budget and rules and may remove members of the PCAOB Board for
cause. 1
30
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, accounting firms must register with the
PCAOB if they prepare or issue audit reports on financial statements filed
in the United States.' 31 This affects foreign accounting firms as well as
of International Business Law Breakfast Roundtable Series (Oct. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch 100705cag.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
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domestic accounting firms. Many U.S. public companies have significant
operations in other countries and hire foreign auditors to audit their foreign
operations. These foreign auditors must register with the PCAOB.
Separately, about 1,200 public companies based outside of the United
States trade in U.S. securities markets. 132  These companies also have
reporting requirements in the United States, and their foreign auditors must
also register with the PCAOB. As of November 21, 2005, 640 non-U.S.
accounting firms based in eighty-one countries were registered with the
PCAOB.113 Theoretically, the PCAOB could assert authority to inspect any
and all of these foreign firms.
134
Foreign regulators expressed concern over this perceived attempt by
the United States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Commenting on
PCAOB proposed rules relating to the oversight of non-U.S. accounting
firms, the Director General for the Internal Market at the European
Commission stressed the need for "a true E.U.-U.S. cooperative approach
on auditor oversight based on effective equivalence of regulation and
oversight."' '3 5 He pointed out that direct inspections of European companies
by PCAOB officials may cause legal or even constitutional difficulties in
some European countries, and the Director General favored limiting the
participation of PCAOB personnel to cases where knowledge of U.S.
standards cannot be secured by other means. 36 Similarly, the Director for
International Financial Markets of the Financial Services Agency of Japan
beseeched the PCAOB to heed the principles of mutual respect for each
jurisdiction's sovereignty and warned that the Japanese Government would
not give consent to the exercise of public authority by the PCAOB,
including inspection and investigation, on Japanese territory.'
Eventually, the PCAOB conceded to some extent to the views of
foreign regulators and to the practical difficulties of sending inspectors to
foreign countries. In June 2004, the Board issued rules providing that a
foreign, registered public accounting firm may request the Board to rely on
132 Id. at 8.
133 PUB. Co. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD. ANN. REP. 5 (2006), available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/About thePCAOB/BudgetPresentations/2006.pdf (last visited
Oct. 29, 2006).
114 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (2006).
135 PCAOB-2004-04: International Rules, Comment by Alexander Schaub, Dir. Gen.,
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(at 105) (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
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inspections conducted by a foreign, home-country supervisor instead of
administering its own investigations.1 38 In response to such a request, the
Board will decide how much reliance to place on the home supervisor by
examining the quality of the foreign supervisory system. The more
independent and rigorous the foreign system, the more the Board will rely
on the home supervisor and the less directly involved the Board needs to
be. 139 Reliance may also depend on the home supervisor's willingness to
update the Board on a regular basis and its willingness to share relevant
findings with the Board. 140 While the PCAOB rules do not make explicit
reference to the term "equivalence," the decision whether to rely on a
foreign supervisor amounts to an equivalence determination, in which the
PCAOB decides whether the foreign supervisory system is as independent
and rigorous as the U.S. regime.
A number of countries have instituted or revised their own auditor
oversight systems with the hope and expectation that the PCAOB will find
home country supervision to be adequate. In April 2004, Japan established
the Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board, a Japanese
counterpart to the PCAOB.141 In the European Union, although there is
already auditor oversight at the level of individual member states, the
European Union is considering a new Directive that seeks to ensure more
robust public oversight over European auditors and would require the
registration of audit firms. 14 The PCAOB has praised these efforts 43 and is
currently in the midst of negotiating with foreign regulators over how to
conduct inspections. These negotiations are still preliminary and are
subject to change as the PCAOB is only beginning to inspect foreign
accounting firms. But already, some observers worry about the lack of
transparency. The Board has not publicly announced a list of countries for
138 PCAOB Release No. 2004-005: Final Rules Relating to the Oversight of Non-U.S.
Public Accounting Finns (June 9, 2004) [hereinafter PCAOB Release], available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_013/2004-06-09_Release_2004-005.pdf (last visited
Oct. 29, 2006).
139 Id. at 32.
140 Id.
141 Establishment of Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board,
available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/cpaaob/english/circumstances.pdf (last visited Oct. 29,
2006).
142 Proposal for a Directive on statutory audit of annual accounts and consolidated
accounts and amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod! DocNumber&lg=en&typ
e_doc=COMfinal&andoc=2004&nudoc= 177 (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
143 The Regulatory Dialogue Between the PCAOB and the European Union Commission:
Hearing Before the House Committe On Finincial Services, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement
of Samantha Ross, Chief of Staff of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), (May
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which it is willing to rely on foreign inspections. Critics fear that the
PCAOB is trying to shield itself from public scrutiny, hiding the fact that it
is making determinations on an ad hoc, unprincipled basis.
D. U.S.-Canada Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System
In place since 1991, the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System
("MJDS") is a joint initiative by the SEC and the Canadian Securities
Administrators designed to facilitate U.S. and Canadian companies in cross-
border transactions by subjecting them only to home country regulation.144
Prior to the MJDS, companies had to prepare two sets of disclosure
documents, one according to U.S. securities laws and the other according to
Canadian laws. The MJDS allows companies to use disclosure documents
filed in their home jurisdiction in the host jurisdiction.145 Additionally, the
host country will defer to the home country's review process. 146 Home
country regulators have primary responsibility for reviewing disclosure
documents, and host country regulators generally forgo review. 4 7 The
MJDS covers cross-border offerings, issuer bids, take-over bids, business
combinations, and continuous disclosure and other filings.
1 48
One might plausibly view the MJDS as a regime that draws upon the
principle of equivalence. Essentially, each country agrees that despite some
differences, the other country's securities regulation regime is "close
enough." Hence, when a Canadian company issues securities under the
MJDS, the company need only comply with Canadian disclosure
requirements and need not worry about U.S. requirements. The SEC
explains:
By adopting the MJDS, the Commission in essence is adopting as its
own requirements the disclosure requirements of Canadian forms.
The effect is the same as if the Commission had set forth each
Canadian requirement within the MJDS forms .... Accordingly,
good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of the home
jurisdiction will constitute compliance with the applicable U.S.
federal securities disclosure requirements, even if such compliance
results in the omission of information which might otherwise have
been required as a line item in registration statements filed by U.S.
144 See SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 46, at 79-84; 56 Fed. Reg. 30036
(1991); BCSC 71-O1CP, The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (Oct. 23, 1998)
[hereinafter Disclosure System], available at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/policy.asp?id= 1299 (last
visited Oct. 29, 2006).
14' 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 (1991); Disclosure System, supra note 144.
146 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 (1991); Disclosure System, supra note 144.
147 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 (1991); Disclosure System, supra note 144.
148 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 (1991); Disclosure System, supra note 144.
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issuers on the Commission's other registration forms. 149
The SEC acknowledges persistent differences between U.S. and Canadian
disclosure requirements, but nevertheless judges the two to be functionally
substitutable.
Concededly, while the MJDS bears some characteristics similar to
equivalence, to call the MJDS "an example of equivalence" would strain
what we mean by the term "equivalence." The MJDS example differs from
the previous three examples in a couple of ways. First, the United States,
rather than accepting Canadian securities law in a wholesale manner,
instead imposes certain additional requirements on Canadian companies.
Most significantly, while Canadian regulators require companies to use
Canadian GAAP, the SEC determined in 1993 that there were "significant
differences in accounting principles and practices ... between Canadian
GAAP and U.S. GAAP" and has since required Canadian companies to
reconcile financial statements to U.S. GAAP. 5 ° Additionally, MJDS
issuers must supplement their registration with certain additional
disclosures that are not required under Canadian law, such as disclosure of
indemnification provisions regarding directors, officers, and controlling
persons.15 1 Moreover, U.S. fraud liability rules-and in particular, Rule
1Ob-5 52-continue to apply.153 In light of these additional requirements,
the MJDS might be more fairly viewed as a type of "equivalence-plus"
regime.
Second, the MJDS is a bilateral agreement. The United States and
Canada mutually agree to allow companies from the other country to be
governed by home country regulation. The SEC rule adopting the MJDS
expressly acknowledges this notion of reciprocity:
Concurrently with the publication of this Release, the Canadian
Securities Administrators are publishing a National Policy Statement
that adopts a largely parallel multi-jurisdictional disclosure system in
Canada. That system permits U.S. issuers to satisfy certain securities
registration and reporting requirements in Canada using disclosure
documents prepared in accordance with Commission requirements.
That National Policy Statement is published as an appendix to this
Release. 154
Here, the SEC emphasizes that the Canadian Policy Statement and the
149 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 n. 130 (1991) (emphasis added).
150 58 Fed. Reg. 35367 (1993).
151 See Scott, Overview, supra note 1, at 29.
52 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2006).
153 See Scott, Overview, supra note 1, at 29.
154 56 Fed. Reg. 3003636 n.130 (1991).
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SEC release were published concurrently, and that the two systems are
largely parallel.55 Canadian issuers coming to the United States benefit
from the agreement, just as U.S. issuers going to Canada benefit. To further
emphasize the point of reciprocity, the SEC even attaches the Canadian
Statement as an appendix. Some commentators have thus categorized the
MJDS as an example of "mutual recognition" rather than equivalence.
56
Mutual recognition is the policy under which a country offers favorable
treatment to companies from a foreign country in return for favorable
treatment of its own companies by the foreign country. 57 It rests on the
principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity. 158 As we shall see, these
principles are largely absent from conventional notions of equivalence,
although the current trend is that equivalence is slowly incorporating these
ideas and grappling towards something akin to mutual recognition.
IV. EVALUATING EQUIVALENCE
A. Potential Benefits
1. Reducing Transaction Costs
The primary justification for equivalence is that it reduces transaction
costs. Absent equivalence, a company seeking to expand its operations into
a foreign country must continue to comply with home country regulations,
and additionally, undertake certain actions to comply with host country
regulations. This may require that the company incur significant financial
costs. Furthermore, if home and host country regulations are comparable,
to insist that the company comply with host country regulation will not
significantly increase protection for investors. The better approach is to
subject the company only to the home country regulatory regime, thus
making it less costly for the company to operate in the host country.
Such is the argument for equivalence in the case of accounting
standards. Absent a finding of equivalence, U.S. companies conducting
public offerings in Europe must prepare IAS financial statements in
addition to U.S. GAAP financial statements. Similarly, a European
company that is listed in the United States must prepare IAS statements for
its home country regulators and U.S. GAAP statements (or statements
reconciled to U.S. GAAP) for the SEC. The resulting costs can be
substantial, thus explaining why financial industries are pushing for
equivalence. In 2002, the Chief Financial Officer of Nokia estimated an
155 Id.
156 Scott, Overview, supra note 1, at 28-29.




annual savings of approximately $500,000 if the SEC would allow Nokia to
maintain its NYSE listing on the basis of IAS disclosure statements
alone.159  More recently, in 2005, an E.U. regulator indicated that he
believed that among the approximately 250 E.U. issuers listed in the United
States, the largest companies spend between $1 million and $10 million per
year to reconcile IAS to U.S. GAAP.
160
Equivalence may also yield significant cost savings in the context of
the Financial Conglomerates Directive. As discussed earlier, pursuant to
the Directive, if a non-E.U. financial conglomerate is not subject to
equivalent home supervision, an E.U. regulator may require the
conglomerate to establish a European holding company for supervisory
purposes. The SEC calculated that the cost for a U.S. company to establish
a holding company in Europe would be approximately $8 million.' 6' The
U.S. company can avoid this expenditure if E.U. regulators find SEC
supervision to be equivalent to E.U. supervision.
In addition to cost savings for firms, equivalence may also produce
cost savings for regulators. For example, the PCAOB's 2006 budget
provides $128.4 million, net of interest, in outlays for the calendar year.16 2
The majority of the outlays are for salaries and other expenses related to the
hiring of the experienced auditors needed to conduct inspections. Firms
with more than 100 public company clients must be inspected annually;
firms with one to 100 public company clients must be inspected every three
years.163 Many of these inspections will occur abroad; as of November 21,
2005, 640 out of 1,586 public accounting firms registered with the Board
(approximately forty percent) were based outside the United States. 164
From this statistic, it seems clear that the PCAOB can significantly reduce
its expenditures if the Board is willing to deem foreign oversight equivalent
to domestic oversight and rely on inspections by foreign counterparts.
Equivalence skeptics would respond that there are other ways to
reduce transactions costs. In particular, those who favor harmonization
159 Benn Steil, Building a Transatlantic Securities Market, International Securities
Market Association in cooperation with the Council on Foreign Relations (2002), available
at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/steil-isma.pdf (last visited Oct. 29,
2006).
160 McCreevy, Convergence Speech, supra note 17.
161 Final Rule: Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, SEC Release No. 34-
49831 (June 14, 2004).
162 Press Release, PCAOB, Board Approves 2006 Budget, Amendments to Tax Rules
(Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Press Release, PCAOB Budget], available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/News andEvents/News/2005/11-22.aspx (last visited Jan. 15,
2007).
163 PCAOB Rule 4003, available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules of_theBoard/
Section_4.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
164 Press Release, PCAOB Budget, supra note 162.
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over equivalence may argue that harmonization yields even lower
transaction costs. Why not pursue harmonization instead of equivalence?
The following subsections list some of the advantages of equivalence over
harmonization.
2. Feasibility
In many situations, full harmonization is not feasible, and equivalence
is a second-best solution. Harmonization may be difficult for a variety of
reasons.
First, harmonization requires broad consensus across countries-
countries must agree to a single set of harmonized regulations. However, it
may be difficult to forge such a consensus; invariably, countries will
disagree on matters of policy. This is especially problematic outside of the
European Union. The European Union at least provides a forum in which
disagreements can be sorted out. But even within Europe, harmonization
has not been easy, and E.U. regulators have been forced to turn to
equivalence. During the 1970s and 1980s, the European Union made
several attempts to harmonize regulations with the aim of creating a single,
integrated internal market-for example, by abolishing custom duties and
other trade restrictions between European states. 165 But these attempts were
largely unsuccessful, and the European Union was forced to retreat from
full harmonization and focus instead on instituting some common minimum
standards. This was the approach in the E.U. Commission's 1985 White
Paper,1 66 which sought to reduce certain barriers to the movement of goods,
services, and capital within Europe. The White Paper acknowledged that
"experience has shown that.., a strategy based totally on harmonization
would be over-regulatory, would take too long to implement, would be
inflexible and could stifle innovation," and "a clear distinction needs to be
drawn in future internal market initiatives between what is essential to
harmonize, and what may be left to mutual recognition of national
regulations and standards." 167 Under the White Paper approach, European
states agree not to put up certain barriers to trade, but are free to enact other
types of regulations.' 6  European states also agree to recognize the
regulations of other member states. Some commentators have described
this intra-E.U. regulatory regime as one based on "equivalence. ' 69
165 See Scott, Overview, supra note 1, at 15.
166 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
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Second, regulatory agencies can only act pursuant to legislative
authorization-full harmonization may be outside their statutory authority.
Such is the situation in the case of accounting standards. As discussed
previously, the SEC currently requires foreign companies to reconcile
foreign financial statements to U.S. GAAP, a very costly process. 170 If the
SEC chooses an equivalence solution, the agency may do so simply by
eliminating the reconciliation requirement. 17  This is clearly within its
statutory authority. In fact, the SEC has already waived reconciliation with
respect to a few IAS standards. In contrast, if the SEC wishes to pursue full
harmonization, the agency may face certain statutory restrictions. For
example, the SEC's roadmap acknowledges as a future possibility the
replacement of FASB with IASB as the official standard setter of U.S.
accounting rules. 172 This is one way to achieve full harmonization. But
even assuming that the SEC wants to switch to IASB, Congress has limited
the SEC's authority to appoint a new standard setter. In particular,
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the standard setter must meet several statutory
requirements. 173 Currently, FASB is the only organization that meets the
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, 174 and the SEC has no choice but to
recognize FASB as the official standard setter. The alternative is to lobby
Congress to amend Sarbanes-Oxley.
Third, harmonization may be infeasible if it is perceived as violating
national regulatory prerogatives; again, in this case, equivalence may serve
as a second-best alternative. This is potentially an issue in the case of IAS-
U.S. GAAP convergence. There has been at least one incident in the recent
past when nationalism stood in the way of accounting reform. When
deciding whether to adopt IAS 39, the European Commission received a
framework for financial markets seems to be grounded in a concept that can be thought of as
a search for equivalence among disparate regulatory and legal systems, while taking into
account the continuing reality of separate and distinct national legal and regulatory regimes
as the basis of any overall E.U. initiatives.") (emphasis added); Campos, supra note 12
("Alex [Schaub, Dir. Gen., Internal Mkt. of the European Comm'n], I think you said that
what now exists in the E.U. is best described as a determination of 'equivalence' and, where
equivalence cannot be achieved, an acceptance of 'diversity' in the standards of member
states.").
170 See discussion supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
171 Congress did not pass a statute mandating reconciliation. The reconciliation
requirement is an agency rule, which the SEC may amend the rule at its own initiative. See
Rule 4-01(a)(2) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(2)(2004).
172 See Nicolaisen, supra note 32, at 670-71 ("For purposes of this article I have assumed
that the FASB will continue as our country's GAAP standard setter, although I recognize
that over time it is possible to imagine that various other scenarios could develop.").
173 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204 (July 30, 2002), 116 Stat.
745, 768, codified in Securities Act § 19(b), which itself is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b).
174 Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: Organization and Influence 11 (Aug. 15,
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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letter from French President Jacques Chirac warning that the adoption of
certain IAS standards would have "nefarious consequences for financial
stability. '' 175 President Chirac's letter was widely interpreted as continental
Europe proclaiming independence from the United Kingdom and the United
States in accounting matters, and the IASB Chairman observed that,
"France... has a different culture of accounting. It is a proud and
independent country and they saw what to them was an alien culture being
rammed down their throat."1 76 One can imagine similar resistance to future
attempts to converge IAS and U.S. GAAP. If full convergence is
infeasible, one view is that regulators should switch to equivalence as a
substitute for convergence.
Similarly, in the case of auditor oversight, equivalence may be the only
feasible option in light of sovereignty concerns. When the PCAOB asserted
jurisdiction over foreign auditors, it was accused of violating the national
sovereignty of foreign nations. Foreign regulators protested fiercely to the
PCAOB assertion that it had authority to inspect and investigate foreign
audit firms. One European regulator declared that direct inspections by
PCAOB officials would cause legal and constitutional difficulties in
European countries, and a Japanese regulator warned that the Japanese
government would not allow the PCAOB to exercise public authority in
Japan. 177 If barred from entering these jurisdictions, the Board will have no
choice but to rely on foreign regulators. This would be de facto recognition
that foreign inspections are equivalent to PCAOB inspections.
3. Flexibility to Address Real Differences
When there are real differences between countries, it may be unwise to
force countries to adopt the same regulations. Harmonization may be
undesirable. Equivalence may be the preferred alternative-one which
allows countries to pursue different rules to accommodate real differences.
In the case of accounting, it may be preferable that Europe and the
United States employ differing accounting standards to accommodate real
differences. In continental Europe-France and Germany, for example-
accounting and taxation are closely integrated. These countries sometimes
use accounting rules as an instrument of tax policy, for example, by
offering tax breaks for businesses by allowing generous measurements of
expenses and modest measurements of revenues. 178 In contrast, the United
States separates accounting and taxation. Tax breaks can be enjoyed
175 Daniel Dombey, France Isolated on LAS Concerns, FIN. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at 26.
176 Robert Bruce, Setting A New Standard, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at 5. For further
discussion of these events, see Fleckner, supra note 174.
177 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.




independently of the way results are reported to shareholders.
179
There are other real differences. The United States has stricter legal
liability standards, and class action suits are available as a means of
enforcement.' 80 For these reasons, it makes sense for the United States to
use a rule-based accounting regime rather than a principle-based accounting
regime.' s' The rule-based approach provides certainty to U.S. companies,
who may follow the rules to avoid liability. 82 In Europe, there is not the
same need for a rule-based approach. 83  As an aside, the fact that
accounting rules are enforced differently in the United States and Europe
raises the issue of whether U.S. accounting standards and European
accounting standards can ever be "truly" equivalent. We will revisit this
idea. For now, the point is simply that there are reasons for having different
accounting standards in Europe and the United States.
These real differences between Europe and the United States push in
favor of equivalence over harmonization. Equivalence allows regulators to
pursue different rules to accommodate real differences. In its concept paper,
CESR emphasized that "equivalent" accounting rules should not mean
"identical" accounting rules; equivalence only means that the rules are
sufficiently alike to enable investors to take similar investment decisions. 84
"For example," CESR explains, "some differences in accounting treatment
may not be significant in terms of equivalence because they arise from
differing legal elements, for instance accounting for tax purposes."'
85
4. Competition of Rules
There is a well-developed line of literature advocating regulatory
competition. Not only does regulatory competition accommodate real
differences, but more importantly, regulatory competition fosters
innovation. It allows regulators to experiment and to learn through trial and
error. In this manner, regulators can develop more efficient regulatory
regimes.
Equivalence, to a lesser degree, shares these same benefits. In a
speech quoted in part earlier, European regulator Alexander Schaub notes
that equivalence incorporates some aspects of regulatory competition:
Working on the basis of equivalence is not an admission of defeat: it
is a healthy recognition by both sides that there can be more than one
179 Id.
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way to achieve a common objective. In many cases, there is no
perfect solution to a regulatory problem. In some cases, the
regulatory solution used in one jurisdiction might not work in the
other. We need an organized and cooperative coexistence: a
managed competition of equivalent systems based on common
underpinnings.
186
Schaub asserts that equivalence, like regulatory competition, allows
countries flexibility to pursue similar objections through different means.
Furthermore, Schaub encourages "managed competition" of regulatory
systems, implying that, over time, competition leads to improvement.
Admittedly, there is more opportunity for innovation under regulatory
competition than under equivalence because equivalence is more restrictive
than regulatory competition. Under equivalence, regulators are free to
experiment to some extent, but they are not given carte blanche. Instead,
regulators must stay within the bounds of what is functionally substitutable.
This illustrates a basic tension of equivalence. On the one hand,
equivalence requires that two regulations are sufficiently similar, or close
enough. On the other hand, equivalence recognizes that it is often
important for different countries to regulate in different ways. Another way
of expressing the same point is that equivalence represents an uneasy
compromise between harmonization and regulatory competition.
B. Potential Pitfalls
1. Insufficient Protection for Host Country Investors
This section lists four warnings regarding equivalence, all related to
investor protection. First, home country substantive law may offer less
investor protection than host country substantive law. Second, home
country laws may be under-enforced. Third, home country regulators may
be unwilling to cooperate with host country regulators. Fourth, if the law,
as applied, is inconsistent across jurisdictions, uncertainty among investors
will result.
Critics of equivalence worry that if regulators import foreign
substantive laws that are less rigorous than domestic laws, this will harm
domestic investors. This may explain why some U.S. regulators have been
reluctant to embrace the concept of equivalence; frankly, they fear that
foreign regulation is too lax and thus not comparable to U.S. regulation.
This concern is most apparent in the accounting context, where despite
pressure from Europe, the SEC remains cautious and hesitant toward
accepting IAS as an alternative to U.S. GAAP. In a recent speech before
186 Schaub Testimony, supra note 10.
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the Federation of European Accountants, the SEC Director of the Office of
International Affairs drew attention to the fact that "accounting standards in
the United States have a long and unique history," that "U.S. GAAP has
been used extensively in the United States since the 1930s," and that today
U.S. GAAP "is widely-used, comprehensive, well-understood, and well-
regarded both at home and internationally." 187 In contrast, "IFRS have only
existed [for]... just a few years," and unlike U.S. GAAP, "it has little to no
history of application and interpretation."'1 88 In other words, the Director is
worried that IAS does not offer sufficient investor protection, at least in its
current form. The SEC will eliminate the reconciliation requirement only
when it is satisfied that the quality of IAS is on par with U.S. GAAP.
Even if two sets of regulations are substantively similar, there is still
the problem of enforcement. This is a concern anytime a host country
regulator relies on the home country regulator to execute laws-for
example, by reviewing disclosure documents or by conducting on-site
inspections. 89 Even if on the books home country regulations appear
identical to host country regulations, the danger still exists that home
country regulations might be under-enforced. Research suggests that
countries vary widely in their actual enforcement of financial regulations,
and consequently similar, or even identical substantive regulations, may
yield different results.' 90
The enforcement problem is one that PCAOB struggles with on a
recurring basis. When the Board decides whether to rely on foreign
inspections, the most pressing issue is the effectiveness of the foreign
enforcement:
Under the Board's rules, a firm would first provide the Board with a
one-time statement asking the Board to rely on a non-U.S.
inspection. At an appropriate time before each inspection of a non-
U.S. firm that has submitted such a statement, the Board would
determine the appropriate degree of reliance based on information
about the non-U.S. system obtained primarily from the non-U.S.
regulator regarding the independence and rigor of the non-U.S.
system. The Board would also base its decision on its discussions
with the appropriate entity or entities within the oversight system
187 Ethiopis Tafara, Dir., Office of International Affairs, SEC, International Financial
Reporting Standards and the U.S. Capital Market, Remarks before the Federation of
European Accountants (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spchl20105et.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
188 Id.
189 See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion
Paper Series No. 521 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-
center/corporate-govemance/papers/Jackson_521 .pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
190 See, e.g., id.
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concerning the specific inspection work program for the non-U.S.
firm's inspection at hand. The more independent and rigorous a
home country system, the higher the Board's reliance on that system.
A higher level of reliance translates into less direct involvement by
the Board in the inspection of the non-U.S. registered public
accounting firm.
The Board's rule on investigations.., provides that the Board may,
in appropriate circumstances, rely upon the investigation or sanction,
if any, of a foreign registered public accounting firm by a non-U.S.
authority. The Board's reliance would depend, in part, on the
independence and rigor of the non-U.S. authority. Reliance also may
depend on the non-U.S. authority's willingness to update the Board
regarding the investigation on a regular basis and its willingness and
authority to share the relevant evidence gathered with the Board.191
The Board emphasizes that in order for foreign enforcement to be
effective, the foreign regulatory authority must be "independent" and
rigorous. Before making its decision, the Board will inquire into the type
and quality of inspections performed by the foreign authority. If the foreign
authority proves to be particularly dependable, the Board may even rely
upon the foreign agency to investigate misconduct by foreign accounting
firms and will honor any sanctions imposed by the foreign agency. But
strong enforcement, by itself, is insufficient. Importantly, even if the
foreign authority is very capable of enforcing the laws, the PCAOB will
hesitate to rely on the agency, unless the agency shows willingness to
cooperate with the Board. Hence, while cooperation and enforcement are
conceptually distinct, it seems that at least in this context they must go
hand-in-hand.
Similarly, the drafters of the E.U. Financial Conglomerate Directive
also recognized the importance of enforcement and cooperation. The
Directive instructs that in order to determine whether third-country
supervision is equivalent to European supervision, E.U. regulators must
consider not only whether the third-country provides group-wide
supervision on the books, but also, whether in practice the third-country
"achieves objectives and results similar to those pursued by the provisions
of this Directive."' 92 But again, good enforcement by itself is not sufficient.
The provision that immediately follows instructs E.U. regulators to ask
whether "the third-country supervisory authorities have agreed to cooperate
with the competent [E.U.] authorities."'' 93 As in the previous example, the
Directive links enforcement with cooperation on the theory that while the
quality of third-country enforcement is important, open communication
191 PCAOB, Release, supra note 138.
192 Council Directive 2002/87/EC, 2002 O.J. (L35), Recital 13 (E.U.).
'9' Id. Recital 14.
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between the third-country regulator and the E.U. regulator is also important,
so that the E.U. regulator can confirm that there is adequate enforcement.
The preceding examples illustrate the importance of enforcement, but
one may ask whether sometimes, equivalence may be possible even without
strong enforcement on both sides. What if the host country does not need to
rely on the home country for enforcement? Let us assume, as is sometimes
alleged, that the European Union enforces accounting standards less
rigorously than the United States? Can IAS and U.S. GAAP nevertheless
be equivalent?
One view is: yes. In this context, perhaps the SEC should not care
whether there is adequate enforcement in Europe, because the SEC can
enforce IAS itself. Unlike the PCAOB case and the E.U. Financial
Conglomerates case, the SEC need not depend on foreign regulators for
enforcement. The SEC only needs to hire some IAS accountants, and it will
be able to interpret and enforce IAS the same way it interprets and enforces
U.S. GAAP.
On the other hand, while there may not be an enforcement problem,
there is an inconsistency problem. The SEC may enforce IAS in the United
States without regard for enforcement in Europe, but the effect is to
establish two IAS regimes-a U.S. IAS regime, and a European IAS
regime. An investor, upon receiving an IAS financial statement, is
uncertain about how to interpret the statement. Should she treat the
statement as if it had been scrutinized under the (hypothetically) stronger
U.S. enforcement regime? Or should she assume that the statement was
filed in the European Union (hypothetically, the weaker regime) and
discount the numbers accordingly? Recognizing this problem, the SEC has
announced that before it accepts IAS in the United States, it will require
evidence showing that "IFRS are applied and interpreted faithfully,
consistently and thoroughly across different jurisdictions and across
different industrial sectors," and that "IFRS are indeed a single set of
international accounting standards and not a multiplicity of standards going
by the same name."' 94 If there are significant disparities in the way foreign
regulators interpret and enforce IAS standards, the SEC will not recognize
IAS as equivalent to U.S. GAAP.
In the case of the E.U. Financial Conglomerate Directive, there
remains a danger of inconsistency in a different sense. Pursuant to the
Directive, the decision of whether third-country supervision is equivalent to
E.U. supervision is left to national regulators, as opposed to E.U.
officials.195 This opens the possibility that different regulators may reach
different conclusions, creating the odd situation that third-country
supervision may be equivalent to E.U. supervision in one E.U. country, but
194 See Tafara, supra note 187.
195 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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not in another. The European Union has tried to address this concern by
issuing "general guidance" documents, which make recommendations
about whether supervision by certain third-countries is equivalent, but these
recommendations are merely advisory and not binding.
19
2. Lack of Transparency
A second potential pitfall is the problem of non-transparency. Two
examples illustrate this. First, when the PCAOB decides whether to rely on
foreign supervisors, its determination is not made public. This is a lack of
transparency. Full transparency would require that the PCAOB announce a
list of countries for which it will substitute foreign inspections for PCAOB
inspections. Second, when the FSA decides whether a foreign financial
conglomerate is subject to equivalence home supervision, its decision is
also not made public-instead, the FSA notifies firms through private
letters. Not only is this an example of non-transparency, but what is
additionally puzzling is that the FSA makes equivalence decisions on a
firm-by-firm basis rather than a country-by-country basis.
Why not more transparency? Why not make equivalence
determinations public? One view is that the PCAOB and the FSA fear
public scrutiny. Perhaps public scrutiny would reveal that the FSA and the
PCAOB make equivalence determinations in an arbitrary, unprincipled
manner. After all, to determine equivalence, a regulator weighs several
considerations-e.g. whether home country laws are adequate, whether
there is sufficient enforcement, whether the home country regulator is
cooperative-in other words, there is no bright line rule. In practice,
perhaps this reduces equivalence to an ad hoc determination. This suggests
that we should be wary of equivalence. But the difficulty with this
explanation is that both the FSA and the PCAOB have promulgated detailed
rules explaining the criteria used to determine equivalence.' If the sole
concern of the FSA and the PCAOB is to avoid public scrutiny, perhaps
they would not have bound themselves to these self-promulgated rules.
Another explanation recognizes that equivalence sometimes involves
complex negotiations, specifically negotiations among the host country
regulator, the home country regulator, and the firm being regulated. For
196 Thus far, there are two general guidance documents. See Third Country Supervision
and Equivalence: European Financial Conglomerates Committee Issues General Guidance to
E.U. Supervisors on Supervision in Switzerland (July 6, 2004); Third Country Supervision
and Equivalence: European Financial Conglomerates Committee Issues General Guidance to
E.U. Supervisors on Supervision in the United States of America (July 6, 2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/financial-conglomerates/supervision-en.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2006).
197 See PCAOB Release, supra note 138; Policy Statement 04/20: Financial groups-





example, in the financial conglomerate context, the FSA may accept SEC
supervision as basically equivalent, but may nevertheless request that the
SEC grant it access to certain information pertaining to the firm or require
that the firm make additional disclosure directly to the FSA. During
negotiations, all three parties may wish to keep communications private
because negotiations are more likely to succeed when parties can
communicate in confidence. Once negotiations conclude, the FSA may
continue to keep the negotiation details private in order not to jeopardize
future negotiations. Otherwise, if the final terms are made public, future
firns and regulators may demand terms from the FSA that are at least as
favorable, putting the FSA in a successively weaker bargaining position.
While this second explanation has some merit, it is not completely
satisfactory either, because it begs the question: why is the FSA making
determinations on a firm-by-firm basis in the first place? Shouldn't
equivalence focus on the home country supervisory regime rather than the
firm? The FSA would likely respond that there are significant differences
between financial conglomerates, even financial conglomerates from the
same country. For example, financial conglomerates in the United States
may be regulated by different regulators-banks are regulated by the
Federal Reserve and securities firms are regulated by the SEC. Hence, the
FSA cannot make a general equivalence determination for each country,
and instead, must independently examine each individual firm.1 9
8
A similar rationale may apply to the PCAOB case. The PCAOB may
wish to rely more heavily on some foreign supervisors and less on others.
To avoid offending the latter group, the PCAOB may wish not to disclose
its evaluations of foreign regulators. Otherwise, all foreign regulators will
demand most-favored status.
3. Competitive Advantage and Competitive Disadvantage
As discussed previously, "equivalent" does not mean "identical."
What if there are significant differences between home country regulation
and host country regulation, but the host country nevertheless deems home
country regulation to be equivalent? If home country regulation is less
restrictive than host country regulation, then host country companies may
be at a competitive disadvantage. If on the other hand, home country
regulation is more restrictive than host country regulation, and the host
country does not allow foreign companies to avail themselves of less
restrictive host country laws, this may be seen as protectionism.
Protectionism gives host country companies an unfair competitive
advantage.
198 The ideas in this section emerged from discussions with Prof. Hal S. Scott, Prof.
Howell Jackson and other members of the International Finance Seminar at Harvard Law
School.
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These are not merely theoretical concerns. In the past, the SEC has
justified its hesitancy to eliminate the reconciliation requirement on the
grounds that the agency does not want to place domestic companies at a
competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis foreign companies. 199 In a 1997 report,
the SEC explained that if IAS standards are not of comparable quality to
U.S. standards, "domestic registrants would be put at a competitive
disadvantage because application of U.S. accounting and reporting
requirements would impose higher disclosure requirements on them than on
foreign enterprises competing for capital in the same markets. 2 °° One fear
is that upon finding themselves at a comparative disadvantage, U.S.
companies may leave the United States to reincorporate abroad. They may
then reenter U.S. capital markets as foreign firms filing IAS financial
statements.20'
4. The Dilemma of Mutual Benefit and Reciprocity
Another problem with the equivalence approach is that equivalence
does not guarantee mutual benefit or reciprocity. Equivalence does not
guarantee mutual benefit, because when a host country decides that home
country regulation is equivalent, most of the immediate benefits accrue to
the home country. To illustrate with a hypothetical, suppose that the
European Union decides to recognize U.S. GAAP as equivalent to IAS.
U.S. companies may now raise capital in Europe without the added cost of
preparing IAS financial statements. European companies receive no direct
benefit. In fact, they may be slightly worse off than before due to increased
competition for capital. Concededly, European investors benefit from being
able to invest in U.S. securities. Nevertheless, the European Union would
undoubtedly prefer that the United States extend the same courtesy to E.U.
firms as the European Union has to U.S. firms.
But equivalence also does not guarantee reciprocity. Whatever the
European Union decides about U.S. GAAP-IAS equivalence, the United
States does not have to accept the European Union's findings. It is entirely
possible to have one-way equivalence-the United States may choose not
to accept IAS as equivalent to U.S. GAAP, even if the European Union
chooses to accept U.S. GAAP as equivalent to IAS.
This poses a problem. The principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity
often form the basis for international cooperation-a country is unlikely to
voluntarily yield to the demands of another country without assurance that
it will receive some benefit in return. In the case of equivalence, it is
199 SEC, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of American Securities Markets (Oct.
1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm.
200 id.
201 MARC 1. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 173 (1999).
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reasonable to think that a country may be unlikely to recognize another
country's regulations as equivalent without assurance that the other country
will also recognize the first country's regulations as equivalent.
If this line of reasoning is correct, for equivalence to have continued
success in the future, the concept of "equivalence" must be reformulated to
incorporate the idea of "reciprocity." Under the equivalence-plus-
reciprocity approach, one country agrees to accept a second country's
regulations as equivalent on the condition that the second country also
accepts the first country's regulations as equivalent. To prevent cheating,
the first country threatens to withhold its equivalences finding if the second
country reneges.
In actuality, equivalence has already begun to evolve into equivalence-
plus-reciprocity. This is apparent in the case of accounting standards. One
early articulation of equivalence-plus-reciprocity was in an April 2004
speech by E.U. Commissioner McCreevy, who declared that equivalence
"is not a one-way street-it is only reasonable for European companies to
expect that U.S. regulators will make similar efforts to judge the
equivalence of our international standards with U.S. GAAP, and once this is
done, to release companies from the costly burdens of converting
standards. 2 °2 In this statement, Commissioner McCreevy blurs the line
between equivalence and mutual recognition. Equivalence no longer means
unilateral action; instead, like mutual recognition, it is conditioned on
reciprocity-the European Union will recognize U.S. GAAP, only if the
United States also recognizes IAS.
One difference between mutual recognition and equivalence-plus-
reciprocity is that the former implies that countries will cooperate with one
another, while the latter suggests that countries may be at odds with one
another. After Commissioner McCreevy's speech, European regulators
continued to urge their U.S. counterparts to accept IAS, but in 2005, the
SEC announced in its "roadmap" that it will postpone the decision on
eliminating the reconciliation requirement until 2009.203 Rebuffed,
European regulators threatened the United States with what one U.S.
regulator disparagingly labeled "reverse reconciliation,, 20 4 but what
European regulators might characterize as equivalence-plus-additional-
requirements. The CESR recommended that even though U.S. GAAP is
broadly equivalent to IAS, with respect to certain IAS standards that are
202 Charlie McCreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Mkt. and Servs., Competitiveness
and Growth in the E.U. through the Development of an Integrated Capital Market and
Banking System, Speech at the Institute of International Finance, Panel on "Regulation and
Consolidation in the Financial Industry," Madrid (Apr. 1, 2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH105/194&format=HT
ML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
203 See Nicolaisen, supra note 32.
204 Glassman, supra note 126.
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significantly different from U.S. GAAP, U.S. companies should make
certain additional disclosures. °5 Only after U.S. GAAP statements are
supplemented with these disclosure statements will they be deemed
equivalent to IAS statements. 206  As indicated earlier, U.S. regulators
reacted negatively. One regulator called this development a "potential
speedbump. 2 °7 Another expressed "bafflement":
I am baffled at the suggestion by some that Europeans should
begin to require U.S. companies to reconcile their U.S. GAAP
financial statements to IFRS. This runs against the direction that
we are taking in the United States and undermines our efforts
towards mutual recognition. Some may assert that this is a useful
bargaining chit to ensure that we Americans will recognize IFRS.
But, I believe that it is counter-productive, ignores historical
precedent and market practice, and diverts attention and energv
from solving the real challenges before us. IFRS will stand or fall
on its own merits. Our efforts should be focused on making sure
that it succeeds.208
This last statement demonstrates how equivalence-plus-reciprocity can feel
less like cooperation and more like strategic interaction.
In the end, the European Union will likely not carry out its threat of
requiring U.S. companies to make additional disclosures. At least for the
short-term, Commissioner McCreevy has indicated that he favors extending
the status quo by continuing to permit U.S. companies to continue to use
U.S. GAAP. 20 9 For the long-term, the solution is still equivalence, but there
is strong consensus that equivalence will be a bilateral process.
Commissioner McCreevy plans to recommend to E.U. Member States and
the European Parliament to postpone the decision on the possible
equivalence of U.S. GAAP with IFRS for two years. "Such a
postponement," he believes, "would align the two timetables for
equivalence and would give both of us the possibility to monitor closely
developments in the other jurisdiction., 210  The suggestion is that any
205 CESR, Technical Advice, supra note 65.
206 id.
207 See Glassman, supra note 126.
208 Paul S. Atkins, SEC Comm'r, Remarks before the European Parliamentary Financial
Services Forum (Oct. 26, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102605
psa.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
209 McCreevy, Convergence Speech, supra note 17.
210 Press Release, European Commission, Accounting Standards: E.U Commissioner
McCreevy and SEC Chairman Cox Affirm Commitment to Elimination of the Need for
Reconciliation Requirements (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/142&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&gui




European finding of equivalence will be conditioned on U.S. reciprocity.
The transformation of equivalence into equivalence-plus-reciprocity is
still more evident in the case of auditor regulation. As discussed
previously, under Sarbanes-Oxley, foreign accounting firms that prepare or
issue audit reports on financial statements that are filed in the United States
must register with the PCAOB.2 1" ' Additionally, the PCAOB threatens to
conduct foreign inspections unless foreign auditors are subject to adequate
home supervision.2 1 In response, the European Union is considering a new
Directive to improve European public oversight over the audit firms. 1 3 The
proposed Directive purports to "provid[e] a basis for effective and balanced
international regulatory co-operation with oversight bodies of third
countries such as the U.S. [PCAOB]."'2 1 4  Furthermore, the Directive
requires that:
Auditors and/or audit firms from third countries that issue audit
reports in relation to securities traded in the E.U., need to be
registered in the E.U. . . and be subject to Member State systems
of oversight, quality assurance and investigations and sanctions. In
order to prevent unnecessary international regulatory overlap Article
46 allows for exemption from registration, oversight, quality
assurance and investigations and sanctions if audit firms from third
countries are subject to equivalent systems of registration and
oversight. Another important obligation is reciprocal treatment of
Member States by the third country. To have a common E.U.
assessment and, thus, secure equal treatment of third countries
throughout the E.U., the Commission will perform this assessment at
E.U. level in cooperation with Member States.
2 15
There are several points to notice about the proposed Directive. First,
the European Union adopts an equivalence approach. The European Union
will require foreign auditors to be subject to domestic oversight, unless the
foreign auditors are already subject to equivalent oversight. Second, the
European Union is protesting what it perceives to be an improper attempt
by the United States to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over European
firms. In response, the European Union threatens to assert European
jurisdiction over U.S. firms. This explains why Europe will make its
equivalence determination at the E.U. level rather than at the national
211 See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
213 Proposal for a Directive on Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated
Accounts and Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&typ
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level-separately, individual European member states are at a size
disadvantage vis-A-vis the United States; united, the threat of European
jurisdiction carries more force.
The third point is that E.U. regulators have formally incorporated the
idea of reciprocity into the concept of "equivalence." The proposed
Directive explicitly states that the European Union will not exempt third
country auditors unless there is reciprocal treatment of European auditors
by the third country. This is a novel and important development. There is
no comparable E.U. statutory or regulatory provision in the accounting
standards context or in the financial conglomerates context; those
Directives were passed a few years earlier, when the concept of equivalence
was not as well understood. The proposed E.U. Auditor Oversight
Directive signals a formal shift from a pure equivalence approach to an
equivalence-plus-reciprocity approach.
V. CONCLUSION
In an earlier era, harmonization appeared the only option for those who
advocated international financial integration. More recently, equivalence
has emerged as a viable alternative. This Article discussed four examples
of the equivalence approach: (1) U.S. and E.U. accounting standards, (2)
E.U. regulation of financial conglomerates, (3) U.S. regulation of auditors,
and (4) the U.S.-Canada Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System. Most of
these examples involve the United States and the European Union, but
equivalence is not limited to the trans-Atlantic context. Equivalence is
currently being applied between the European Union and Switzerland (for
financial conglomerates), the European Union and Canada (for accounting
standards), and the European Union and Japan (for accounting standards).
In the future, as the United States and Japan pursue closer regulatory
cooperation,21 6 equivalence may be used there as well.
Even as equivalence has become more common, the precise
relationship between equivalence and harmonization remains a matter of
considerable debate. The dominant understanding is that harmonization
and equivalence are two distinct concepts. Harmonization pushes for rules
to become similar; equivalence allows differences to persist. A
counterpoint understanding is that harmonization and equivalence are more
alike than distinct-like harmonization, equivalence should focus on
making rules more similar rather than acknowledging persistent differences.
There is a third understanding of equivalence, one which rejects altogether
the notion that we should focus on legal similarities and differences;
instead, the market-based test suggests that two regulatory regimes that
have different legal characteristics may nevertheless be "equivalent" if they
216 See, e.g., Glassman, supra note 126.
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produce the same economic effects.
This Article takes the view that equivalence and harmonization are not
mutually exclusive; instead, they can and ought to be used in combination
with one another. Nevertheless, there are some situations in which we will
want more harmonization, and others in which we will want more
equivalence. In general, where there is no overarching, international
political structure such as the European Union, equivalence has the
advantage of feasibility, flexibility, and being conducive to healthy
regulatory competition.
On the other hand, proponents of equivalence should recognize and
avoid potential pitfalls. Regulators should be careful not to jeopardize
investor protection, which is the primary reason for having securities
regulations in the first place. Also, regulators should disclose their
equivalence findings to the public, or alternatively, offer reasons for non-
disclosure. They should also take care that equivalence does not distort the
market, giving some companies an unfair competitive advantage over other
companies. Most importantly, regulators must not overlook the importance
of mutual benefit and reciprocity; otherwise, they risk impasse and
stalemate.
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